

**FOREWORD**

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**Supporting Data for the Estimates of the Trans-Siberian  
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FOREWORD

This study was prepared by the Transportation Capabilities Estimate Group, an inter-agency group sponsored by Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; and composed of representatives from that Office and the Offices of the Chief of Engineers and the Chief of Transportation, Department of the Army; and from the Department of the Air Force, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The members of the Group from the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency are unable to concur in the estimates and major conclusions contained in this study. These reservations are described in detail in paragraph 10 of this paper.

DRAFT FOOTNOTE FOR BODY OF PAPER

The CIA member is unable to concur in the estimates of the capability of the various railroad sectors and the through capability contained in this report. Estimates of traffic in 1956 (See CIA RR 3P, The Volume and Character of Traffic on the Trans-Siberian Railroad in 1953, 9 November 1956.) moving westbound over the Omsk-Novosibirsk and Achinsk-Tayshet sectors exceed the capability given in this report for steam operations over these sectors. Capability estimates on other sectors, and the through capability estimate will support the traffic estimated to be moving. The traffic estimates on the two mentioned sectors, however, are alarmingly higher than the capability estimated for these sectors - about 50 percent in the case of the Omsk-Novosibirsk sector and about 30 percent in the case of the Achinsk-Tayshet sector. This discrepancy between estimated capability and analysis of actual traffic movement on these sectors challenges the validity of the other sector capability estimates and the through capability estimated in this report.

It is significant, moreover, that the current through capability estimate is lower by nine percent than the estimate in a report prepared by the Economic Intelligence Committee's Subcommittee on Transportation on this subject in 1952 and approved by the Economic Intelligence Committee on 23 March 1953, EIC P9, Capability of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and Connecting Lines in Manchuria and Korea. Information made available to the US Government since 1953 shows a considerable increase in the size of the economy of the area traversed by the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Between 1953 and 1955 alone, for example, there was an increase of 27 percent in the railroad tonnage originated and 20 percent in the tonnage terminated in the Oblasts served

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by the Trans-Siberian. (See CIA FDD Translation no 644, May 1957, The Economy of the RSFSR, OFF URE.)

Labor and other high yield capital inputs can be applied to a railroad system over a relatively short period of time to increase the capability markedly. The CIA member of the TCEG, therefore, concludes that the estimates in this paper are too conservative. In their preparation there was not sufficient weight given to the information available on the growth and strength of the economy traversed by the line, as reflected in the CIA traffic studies, and the expansion of the railroad system in response to regional and national traffic requirements. The estimates contained herein have resulted from the use of an inflexible methodology which requires a precise inventory of current facilities and the application of current realistic utilization factors to the inventory of facilities. The inventory of facilities (yards and locomotive servicing and repair shops) used in this report is in large part either old or incomplete. The utilization factors were selected by the majority of the Working Group on the basis of what seemed reasonable in terms of US or Canadian railroad operating experience rather than on the basis of detailed research in the USSR literature in order to attempt to secure USSR railroad utilization factors, and to understand differences in optimum USSR operating methods as compared to those of the United States. More recent and more complete information would almost certainly indicate a considerably greater through capability.

The CIA member, therefore, regards it as unrealistic to apply a rigid methodology consisting of an inventory based on old and incomplete information and possibly improper utilization factors which produce estimates of capability far below reasonable traffic estimates. He concludes that the through capability of the line is now significantly greater than the

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estimate contained in the above cited Economic Intelligence Report, and that estimates of current traffic certainly should represent a minimum capability of individual sectors of the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

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